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Introduction
The rising concern about terrorism after the tragic terrorist attacks
against the United States on September 11, 2001 has allowed many coun-
tries to use the guise of fighting terrorists to intensify their suppression of
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political opponents, separatists, and religious groups.' The use of anti-ter-
rorism legislation to suppress dissent is successful because of the combina-
tion of recent terrorist attacks, political sentiments, and the lack of a
precise definition of terrorism in the international community. 2 At their
annual meeting in Geneva in June 2003, United Nations (UN) special rap-
porteurs and independent experts expressed concern about the growing
threats against human rights that have resulted from the varying policies,
legislation, and practices that many countries have adopted in the name of
fighting terrorism.3 In particular, the UN rapporteurs expressed concern
about "the indiscriminate use of the term 'terrorism', and the resulting new
categories of discrimination."'4
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of
20015 (the Patriot Act) is an example of anti-terrorism legislation that was
passed hastily and resulted in vague legislation which grants the govern-
ment broad powers to monitor citizens.6 Yet, after the signing of the Inter-
American Convention Against Terrorism, 7 other countries used the Patriot
Act as a model for their anti-terrorism laws. 8 El Salvador was one of the
1. See, e.g. Amnesty Int'l, Charting War on Terrorism, AMNESTY NOW MAO.,
Summer 2002, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/WarOnTerrorism/Charting-WOT
.Amnesty.html (citing various countries' anti-terrorism legislation and judicial deci-
sions following September 11, 2001).
2. See Ben Golder & George Williams, What Is 'Terrorism'? Problems of Legal Defini-
tion, 27 U. NEW S. WALES LJ. 270, 271-72 (2004) ("Today, it is clearly necessary to
develop a coherent legal description of terrorism .... For example, national laws now
criminalize 'terrorist acts', give police enhanced powers of investigation and arrest in
regard to such offences, establish regimes for the electronic surveillance of people sus-
pected of terrorism, deny visas to people engaged in terrorism, freeze the assets of 'ter-
rorist organisations' and impose trade sanctions on countries that harbour or support
terrorists."); Sharon H. Rackow, Comment, How the USA Patriot Act Will Permit Govern-
mental Infringement upon the Privacy of Americans in the Name of "Intelligence" Investiga-
tions, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1651, 1651-52 (2002) (noting the political sentiments
following the events of September 11th allowed the passage of legislation that greatly
restricted domestic liberties).
3. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Report of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-up to the World Confer-
ence on Human Rights: Effective Functioning of Human Rights Mechanisms, Annex I, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2004/4 (Aug. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Report of U.N. High Comm. for Human
Rights].
4. Id.
5. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
6. See, e.g., Rackow, supra note 2, at 1651-52 (noting the Patriot Act was formed
"without deliberation or debate" and that several provisions of the bill permit the gov-
ernment to intrude upon the private lives of law-abiding Americans); see also Adam
Clymer, Antiterrorism Bill Passes; U.S. Gets Expanded Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001,
at Al ("Senator Feingold, while praising his colleagues for denying Mr. Ashcroft some of
the powers he sought, complained of 'relentless' pressure to move quickly, 'without
deliberation or debate."').
7. Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism,
June 3, 2002, A.G. Res. 1840, OAS Doc. XXXII-O/02, entered into force July 10, 2003.
8. See, e.g., Day to Day: El Salvador's Anti-Terrorism Law Draws Criticism (NPR radio
broadcast Oct. 11, 2007) [hereinafter NPR Broadcast], available at http://www.npr.org/
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countries that joined in the war on terror and used the Patriot Act as a
model for its own legislation.9 On October 17, 2006, the Salvadoran legis-
lature enacted a vague anti-terrorism law, Decreto No. 108, the Special Law
Against Acts of Terrorism (SLAAT) which allows the government to repress
its citizens' right to free expressionl 0-a right protected both under inter-
national law" and the Salvadoran Constitution. 12 The Salvadoran Execu-
tive has used this anti-terrorism law to quiet political dissent and to
threaten Salvadoran citizens' democratic right to free speech.1 3
A student protest in 2006 served as the excuse for enacting the
SLAAT. 14 On July 5, 2006, students at the University of El Salvador pro-
tested against rising bus ticket prices.' 5 Riot police arrived at the Univer-
sity of El Salvador to calm the protests. 6 Police officers fired tear gas at the
students and violence ensued.' 7 Two officers died and ten were
wounded.' 8 Students and members of the faculty and staff were also
injured.19 President Tony Saca blamed the violence on the Farabundo
Marti National Liberation Front Party (FMLN), the group that fought
against the government during the twelve-year civil war.20 The government
considered this protest a threat to national security, and so the legislature
began working to enact the current anti-terrorism law.2 1
The SLAAT appears neutral on its face, but the government is applying
the law in a way that suppresses opposition. Although the use of anti-ter-
templates/story/story.php?storyld-15185094 (audio file) ("The government of El Salva-
dor is being criticized for an anti-terrorism law it passed last year. The law is modeled
on the U.S. Patriot Act."); Richard Tyler, Britain Prepares its Own Version of US Patriot
Act, WORLD SOCIALIST WEBSITE, Jan. 21, 2004, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/jan
2004/patri-j21.shtml (noting the need to pass legislation for post-September 11th
Britain).
9. See Donna Miles, Rumsfeld Honors Vets, Salvadoran Contributions to Terror War,
U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 12, 2004, http://www.defenselink.
mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=24852 (U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
called El Salvador "a strong ally of the global war on terror and a nation that under-
stands well the human struggle for liberty and democracy"); see also NPR Broadcast,
supra note 8.
10. Decreto No. 108, 11 Oct. 2006, Ley Especial Contra Actos De Terrorismo [Spe-
cial Law Against Acts of Terrorism] chap. III, art. 8, Diario Oficial, 17 Oct. 2006 (El
Sal.).
11. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 19, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
12. Constituci6n de la Republica de El Salvador [Constitution] tit. II, ch. I, art. 6,
Diario Oficial, Tomo No. 281, 16 Dec. 1983 (El Sal.).
13. See Press Release, Amnesty Int'l U.S., Amnesty International Criticizes El Salva-
dor for Using Anti-Terrorism Laws to Punish Social Protesters (July 18, 2007), available
at http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?-ang=&id=ENGUSA20070718001.
14. Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the Seeds of Revolution in El Salvador, NOTICEN:
CENT. AM. & CARIBBEAN AFF., Aug. 17, 2006 [hereinafter Seeds of Revolution].







21. Seeds of Revolution, supra note 14.
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rorism laws to repress dissent is a common problem in many countries, 22
El Salvador's recent history with civil war and the assassinations of those
opposing the government make it especially important for El Salvador to
address this issue. 23 If the Salvadoran government continues on the cur-
rent path of repression, it will cause a breakdown of democracy.
The Salvadoran anti-terrorism law violates the constitutional rights of
its citizens. Article 6 of El Salvador's Constitution grants citizens the right
to "express and to freely spread their thoughts,"24 and provides that this
right "will not be subject to prior examination, censorship nor caution."2 5
Yet, the government is violating the right to free expression through the
application of the anti-terrorism law. El Salvador is also a party to various
international agreements that protect freedom of expression and the right
to peaceful assembly.2 6 The government's acts at the University of El Sal-
vador violated these rights as well.
This Note will focus on El Salvador as an example of one of the many
countries that has adopted vague legislation against terrorism and then
used it to repress political dissent. This study will illustrate the dangers
that potentially face citizens if other countries also adopt overly broad and
vague anti-terrorism legislation. Part I focuses on the international com-
munity's need for a more precise definition of terrorism. It also provides
examples of countries that have enacted vague anti-terrorism legislation
and describes how these countries have used such legislation for inappro-
priate purposes. Part II focuses on El Salvador's definition of terrorism.
This section also compares El Salvador's recent history of repressing dis-
sent and violating human rights with its current application of the SLAAT.
Finally, this section discusses the theory of authorized repression and how
central governments legitimize oppression. Part III illustrates how the
22. See, e.g., Karima Bennoune, Terror/Torture, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 25-26
(2008) (noting that Amnesty International frequently critiques reports using the word
"terrorism" to categorize non-violent dissidents); Stanley A. Cohen, Law in a Fearful Soci-
ety: How Much Security?, 54 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 143, 157-58 (2005) (discussing
Canadian criminal law enforcement in a post-September 11 th world and how anti-terror-
ism legislation works to repress citizens' dissent); Dane E. Johnson, Comment, Cages,
Clinics, and Consequences: The Chilling Problem of Controlling Special-Interest Extremism,
86 OR. L. REV. 249, 257 (2007) ("Characteriz[ing] violent activism as terrorism is likely
to repress willingness to engage in nonviolent protest for those causes. Confrontational
protest activities, such as those of radical environmentalists, antiglobalization advocates,
and abortion opponents, may be vulnerable to characterization as acts of domestic ter-
rorism ....").
23. See Reed Brody, The United Nations and Human Rights in El Salvador's "Negotiated
Revolution", 8 HARV. HUm. RTs. J. 153, 153 (1995) ("From 1980 to 1991, El Salvador was
the scene of a bloody civil war ....").
24. Constitucion de la Republica de El Salvador tit. I, ch. 1, art. 6, Diario Oficial,
Tomo No. 281, 16 Dec. 1983 (El Sal.) (translated by author).
25. Id. (translated by author).
26. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights
art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (ratified by El Salvador
June 20, 1978) [hereinafter ACHR; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), arts. 19, 21, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force for El Salvador Feb. 29, 1980) [hereinafter
ICCPR]; UDHR, supra note 11, art. 19.
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SLAAT violates both the Salvadoran Constitution and El Salvador's obliga-
tions under international treaties. Part IV discusses the international
implications of El Salvador's current legislation and policies.
1. The Challenge of Defining "Terrorism"
It is easy for governments to label opposition groups as terrorists and
to use this claim as an excuse to suspend civil liberties and use extensive
means of repression. 27 Because of the dangers that anti-terrorism mea-
sures pose to individual freedoms, it is imperative that the international
community develop a neutral definition of "terrorism" and "terrorist."
Currently, the lack of a precise definition of "terrorism," both in interna-
tional law28 and in the laws of specific countries such as El Salvador, 29
allows legislatures to enact anti-terrorism laws that look neutral on their
face, but are applied in a way that suppresses opposition to the ruling
government. 30
A. Defining "Terrorism" Internationally
There is currently no widely accepted, neutral definition of "terror-
ism."3 1 The UN has defined terrorism as "criminal acts intended or calcu-
lated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons
or particular persons for political purposes."3 2 This definition, however,
lacks consensus and is quite vague. 33 The lack of a clear internationally
accepted definition of terrorism is due to unsuccessful efforts to draft an
anti-terror convention and because of the difficulties in getting states to
agree. 34 For example, many states disagree on whether the actions of mili-
tary forces during armed conflict should be jurisdictionally excluded from
27. See generally Carlos H. Conde, Philippine Senate Approves Anti-Terrorism Legisla-
tion, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 8, 2007, at 4; Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Refuses
Case Challenging Group's Designation as Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at Al (dis-
cussing how post-September 11th legislation in the United States allows for permanent
designation of groups as terrorist and precludes individual defendants from challenging
that designation at trial).
28. See generally Bennoune, supra note 22; Michael J. Dennis, The Fifty-Seventh Ses-
sion of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 181, 183 (2002).
29. See infra Part Ill.
30. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES WORLDWIDE 1, 10-25 (2003) [hereinafter HRW BRIEFING PAPER], available at
http://iilj.org/courses/documents/HRWl OCountrySurveyofConcernsaboutHuman
RightsandCTCMeasures.pdf.
31. See CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERROR AND ANTI-TERRORISM: A NORMATIVE AND
PRACTICAL ASSESSMENT 23-35 (2006).
32. G.A. Res. 50/53, If 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/53 (Dec. 11, 1995).
33. BLAKESLEY, supra note 31, at 32-33; see SIOBHAN DOWD, INT'L PEN, ANTI-TERROR-
ISM, WRITERS, AND FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 14-15 (2003), available at http://
insanhaklarimerkezi.bilgi.edu.tr/sourceingiizce/4.2.5.5/PEN-Writes%201n%2OPrison
%20Comitee%20-%2OReport%20%E2%80%93%20Anti-Terrorism%20Write.pdf.
34. Ad Hoc Committee, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General
Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/60/37 (Apr. 1,
2005).
Cornell International Law Journal
the definition of terrorism.35 Some states argue that various UN General
Assembly resolutions and declarations, as well as anti-terrorism conven-
tions, contain a central definition of what constitutes terrorism under inter-
national law. 36 Others argue that the problem of defining terrorism still
exists even with such resolutions, declarations, and conventions.3 7 Despite
disagreement about the definition of terrorism, most states agree on the
importance of having an internationally accepted definition of terrorism.38
Professor Christopher Blakesley agrees that it is imperative to have a
neutral definition of terrorism.3 9 He defines terrorism as
violence committed by any means; causing death, great bodily harm, or seri-
ous property damage; to innocent individuals; with the intent to cause those
consequences or with wanton disregard for those consequences; and for the
purpose of coercing or intimidating some specific group, or government, or
otherwise to gain some perceived political, military, religious, or other philo-
sophical benefit.
4 0
Blakesley's definition is more neutral than the legal definitions that coun-
tries have adopted in their domestic legislation. 4 1 Notably, his definition
encompasses acts of terrorism by both state and non-state actors. 4 2 Unfor-
tunately, Blakesley's definition is not yet widely accepted. 4 3 As a result, the
term "terrorism" remains overly inclusive because almost all acts of vio-
lence committed for political purposes fall within its scope. 44
A problem with defining terrorism is that states have a vested interest
in a vague definition that allows them to include many persons and groups
within it, while allowing the state itself to use terrorism without penalty.
To this end, states have defined terrorism in a way that excludes state ter-
rorism and allows for a defense of "extreme emergency." 45 This defense, in
effect, creates a double standard by justifying a state's use of terrorism in
35. T.M.A. Luey, Defining "Terrorism" in South and East Asia, 38 HONG KONG L.J.
129, 139-40 (2008).
36. See generally Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a
Legal Concept in International Law and its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation,
29 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 23, 23 (2006) (arguing that there is a core international
law definition of terrorism).
37. See, e.g., Andrea Bianchi, Security Council's Anti-Terror Resolutions and Their
Implementation by Member States, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JusT. 1044, 1049 (2006).
38. See id. at 1048-49; Young, supra note 36, at 31-33.
39. BLAKESLEY, supra note 31, at 46.
40. Id.
41. See Golder & Williams, supra note 2, at 275-86 (discussing statutory definitions
of terrorism employed by the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada,
New Zealand, and South Africa, and noting their broad and vague nature).
42. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Ruminations and Terrorism: Expiation and Exposi-
tion, 10 NEw CraM. L. REv. 554, 580 (2007).
43. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, An Introduction to and Commentary on Terrorism and the
Law, 19 CONN. L. REv. 697, 721 (1987) (noting that Blakesley's "definitional scheme is
flawed because it lacks a needed terror purpose or terror outcome, it contains the value-
laden criterion of 'innocent', and it is otherwise far too broad to be sufficiently
descriptive").
44. BLAKESLEY, supra note 31, at xviii.
45. Id. at 213-14.
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certain situations.4 6 In light of these concerns, a clear definition of terror-
ism is necessary to ensure that a person accused of committing an act of
terrorism is not deprived of due process of law.4 7
Part of the danger in adopting a definition of terrorism that allows for
an "extreme emergency" exception is that it is difficult to distinguish
between state terrorism and terrorism by non-state actors. 48 Decoloniza-
tion and the Cold War led to a rise in nationalist and ideologically based
terrorism, fought by large states through proxy groups. 4 9 For example, the
United States supported the Contras in Nicaragua against the Sandinista
regime, and the Contras engaged in murders, rapes, and kidnappings of
innocent civilians. 50 In El Salvador, the United States supplied the Salvado-
ran army with military aid in the form of training, weapons, aircraft, and
intelligence to sustain the army in its fight against the FMLN. 5 ' Similar to
the Contras in Nicaragua, the Salvadoran army murdered and kidnapped
innocent civilians.5 2 However, the governments of El Salvador and Nicara-
gua did not consider many of these acts to be terrorism and no one was
punished.5 3 This is because many states' definition of terrorism reflects
the distribution of political power within their states.54
For many years the dominant interpretation of "terrorism" has been
"violence thrust on society by radical elements bent on destroying the sta-
tus quo." 55 This interpretation continues to this day and is evident in the
way that many countries have used their anti-terrorism legislation to target
political opponents and minorities.5 6 As a result, human rights often take
a second seat to national security concerns,5 7 especially when anti-terror-
ism legislation is drafted hastily.
B. Examples of Vague Domestic Anti-Terrorism Legislation
India passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) on March 28,
2002,58 and the Indian government later used this legislation to target
46. See id.
47. Id. at 217 (stating that a working definition of terrorism is necessary in order to
prosecute people for it).
48. See Laura K. Donohue, Terrorism and the Counter-Terrorist Discourse, in GLOBAL
ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 13, 17 (Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2005).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. JOHN A. BOOTH, CHRISTINE J. WADE & THOMAS W. WALKER, UNDERSTANDING CEN-
TRAL AMERICA: GLOBAL FORCES, REBELLION, AND CHANGE 105 (4th ed. 2006).
52. Id. at 108-10.
53. See Shawn L. Bird & Philip J. Williams, El Salvador: Revolt and Negotiated Transi-
tion, in REPRESSION, RESISTANCE, AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN CENTRAL AMERICA 25, 33
(Thomas W. Walker & Ariel C. Armony eds., 2000).
54. Donohue, supra note 48, at 19.
55. Id.
56. See infra Part I.B.
57. C. Raj Kumar, Human Rights Implications of National Security Laws in India: Com-
bating Terrorism While Preserving Civil Liberties, 33 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 195, 196
(2005).
58. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 15 of 2002; India Code (2002).
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political opponents. 59 Lawmakers modeled POTA after the Terrorists and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) of 1985,60 which was often
used inappropriately to target minorities and political dissenters. 6 1
POTA's broad definition of terrorism expanded the state's investigative and
procedural powers. 6 2 As defined by the POTA, a terrorist:
is or continues to be a member of an association declared unlawful under
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), or voluntarily
does an act aiding or promoting in any manner the objects of such associa-
tion and in either case is in possession of any unlicensed firearms, ammuni-
tion, explosive or other instrument or substance capable of causing mass
destruction and commits any act resulting in loss of human life or grievous
injury to any person or causes significant damage to any property, commits
a terrorist act. 63
Due to the abuse of power by law enforcement officials under the guise of
enforcing POTA, 79 people died while in police custody and 580 died in
judicial custody between April and August of 2002.64 Like TADA, POTA
allowed the government to use the broad definition of terrorism to target
political opponents. 65 A presidential ordinance repealed POTA in 2004,
but the amendments of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA)
retained some of its provisions. 66
China amended its Criminal Law in 2001 to criminalize participation
in a "terrorist organization" and engagement in "terrorist activities."'6 7 Yet,
China's legislation fails to define "terrorist," "terrorist organization," or
"terrorist activities" anywhere.6 8 This is alarming, especially because the
legislation can impose a life sentence on those who are found to have par-
ticipated in a terrorist organization. 69 With this new legislation, China has
attempted to equate independence movements with terrorism. 70 China
has also systematically violated due process rights and the right to a fair
trial in connection with its "strike hard" campaign. 7 1
II. Defining Terrorism in El Salvador
Like India and China,7 2 the Salvadoran government is using the new
59. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003: INDIA 241 (2003) [hereinafter
HRW WORLD REPORT 2003], available at http://hrw.org/wr2k3/pdf/india.pdf.
60. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, No. 28 of 1987; India
Code (1987).
61. See HRW WORLD REPORT 2003, supra note 59, at 241; see also Kumar, supra note
57, at 207.
62. HRW WORLD REPORT 2003, supra note 59, at 241.
63. Prevention of Terrorism Act, ch. 2, § 3(1)(b).
64. Kumar, supra note 57, at 206.
65. HRW WORLD REPORT 2003, supra note 59, at 241-43.
66. Kumar, supra note 57, at 196.
67. Luey, supra note 35, at 159.
68. Id. at 160.
69. Id.
70. HRW BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 30, at 10-11.
71. Id.
72. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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anti-terrorism law and its broad definition of terrorism to silence dissent.73
Many countries, such as India, China, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, have hurriedly enacted their anti-terrorism laws, failing to take the
time to carefully consider an appropriate definition of terrorism. 7 4 These
countries have enacted anti-terrorism laws after a poignant event that is
perceived as a threat to national security or is deemed a terrorist attack.
75
Victor V. Ramraj argues that following a threat to national security, public
fear of terrorism is heightened and politicians respond to public emotion
by passing laws that are aimed more at addressing public fears than at
finding a solution that works for the common good.76 This was the case in
El Salvador where the anti-terrorism law was enacted only a few months
after the violent student protest at the University of El Salvador.7 7 The fact
that the definitions section of the Salvadoran law fails to define terrorism
explicitly78 evidences that the legislature was more concerned with
addressing public fears than with enacting effective legislation.
A. The Special Law Against Acts of Terrorism
Because anti-terrorism laws will be used to prosecute individuals
engaging in "terrorist activities," the definition of the terrorist activities
must contain clear and identifiable elements. 79 This is so because a crimi-
nal prosecution requires that the constituent elements of the crime be
proved or disproved. 80 Thus, a legislature's failure to properly define the
criminal act of terrorism or its constituent elements may lead to illegitimate
prosecutions. 8 1
The danger of wrongful prosecution is especially prevalent because
states do not recognize that their own acts can constitute terrorism.
82
States mislead themselves by thinking that only their enemies can commit
terrorism.8 3 Because of El Salvador's history of human rights abuses and
repression by military officials, the idea that the state can "do no wrong"
73. See, e.g., Ruth Melany Cruz, Capturan a Ramirez por Actos Terroristas [Ramirez
Caught Due to Terrorist Acts], LA PRENSA GRAFICA (El Sal.), Feb. 18, 2007, at 2, available at
http://www.laprensagrafica.com/nacion/719196.asp.
74. See Victor V. Ramraj, Terrorism, Risk Perception and Judicial Review, in GLOBAL
ANTI-TERRORISM LAw AND POLICY, supra note 48, at 107, 113; Kent Roach, The Criminal
Law and Terrorism, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY, supra note 48, at 129,
131 (giving examples of criminal laws created as direct responses to terrorist acts).
75. See Ramraj, supra note 74, at 107, 113.
76. Id. at 113.
77. See Seeds of Revolution, supra note 14.
78. Decreto No. 108, 11 Oct. 2006, Ley Especial Contra Actos De Terrorismo [Spe-
cial Law Against Acts of Terrorism] chap. 1I, art. 4, Diario Oficial, 17 Oct. 2006 (El Sal.).
79. See BLAKESLEY, supra note 31, at 177.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 177-78.
82. See id. at 213 (stating that some states' definitions of terrorism exclude the idea
of state terrorism).
83. See id. at 219 (arguing that states apply the term terrorism to encompass a wide
range of enemy conduct).
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potentially presents a special challenge.84 Salvadoran people have not for-
gotten how the ruling powers abused and killed citizens "in the name of
justice."8 5 For a long time, Salvadoran civil society was under the rule of
an authoritarian regime that used terror to "restrict, restrain, and punish
the citizen for his demands and peaceful manifestations. ' ' 6 Therefore, a
law in which the definition of terrorism excludes the state's repression of
its own citizens is likely to increase citizens' fear that they are returning to
dictatorship and repression.
Recent events in El Salvador demonstrate that the danger of the gov-
ernment using the anti-terrorism law for repression and wrongful prosecu-
tions is especially prevalent in El Salvador.8 7 This danger is due to the lack
of a definition of terrorism and "terrorist activities" in the Salvadoran anti-
terrorism law. The only semblance of a definition of terrorism in the
SLAAT is in Article 1, which states the purpose of the law.88 The purpose
of the law is to prevent, investigate, sentence, and punish crimes that:
by their form of execution, means and methods employed, evidence the
intention to provoke a state of alarm, fear, or terror in the population, by
putting in imminent danger or affecting peoples' lives or physical or mental
integrity, or their valuable material goods, or the democratic system or secur-
ity of the State, or international peace.8 9
This provision is too vague to serve as a workable definition of terrorism.
Article 5 of the Special Law Against Acts of Terrorism is also too broad
to be useful. Under this provision, actions executed:
against the life, the personal integrity, the liberty or safety of an internation-
ally protected person, of the presidents of the three branches of the govern-
ment or those who take their place, and of the remaining public officials or
authorities; or against their families who reside in their homes, when these
acts are committed by reason of the functions that these officials must per-
form, will be sanctioned with a prison term of forty to sixty years. 90
While the activities described in Article 5 of the SLAAT are criminal, 9 1
they do not include the intent element that is usually included in any pro-
84. See Bird & Williams, supra note 53, at 39 (stating that the issue of human rights
abuses by military officers was a special challenge in the negotiations leading to the
peace accords).
85. See Oscar Martinez Pefiate, El Futuro de El Salvador de Cara al Siglo XXI [The
Future of El Salvador for the 21st Century], in EL SALVADOR: HISTORIA GENERAL [EL SALVA-
DOR: GENERAL HISTORY] 165, 175 (Oscar Martinez Pefiate ed., 2002).
86. OSCAR MARTINEZ PERATE, EL SALVADOR: DEMOCRACIA Y AUTORITARISMO [EL SALVA-
DOR: DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM] 79 (Editorial Nuevo Enfoque 1996) (translated
by author).
87. See, e.g., Journalist Accused of "Terrorism" Conditionally Released, REP. WITHOUT
BORDERS, July 24, 2007, http://www.rsf.org/print.php3?id-article=22867 (describing the
use of El Salvador's anti-terrorist law to detain a journalist).
88. Decreto No. 108, 11 Oct. 2006, Ley Especial Contra Actos De Terrorismo [Spe-
cial Law Against Acts of Terrorism] chap. I, art. 1, Diario Oficial, 17 Oct. 2006 (El Sal.).
89. Id. (translated by author).




posed definition of terrorism.92 The UN definition described above
requires intent to provoke a state of terror for political purposes. 93 Blake-
sley's definition requires a "purpose of coercing or intimidating some spe-
cific group, or government, or otherwise to gain some perceived political,
military, religious, or other philosophical benefit."'94 The provision in Arti-
cle 5 criminalizes any acts aimed at "destroying or damaging" the lives or
belongings of government officials and does not require an intent to cause
terror or to intimidate for the purpose of obtaining a philosophical bene-
fit.95 El Salvador's criminal laws could cover this type of behavior since it
could be untied to terrorism.96
Article 8 is another sweeping provision. This prescribes a five to ten
year prison sentence to anyone who publicly "justifies terrorism or incites
another or others to commit any of the crimes listed in the law."' 97 This
provision is vague and is subject to the interpretation of those who con-
sider the actor an enemy. It also seems vague enough to allow the state to
curb freedom of speech, and the state used it in such a manner in El
Salvador.98
B. A History of Repressing Dissent: Failing Democracy and Guerilla
Warfare
The Salvadoran government's current reaction to political dissent is
reminiscent of the way the government dealt with dissent throughout the
period of military dictatorship in the 1970s and 1980s.9 9 During that
period, a powerful oligarchy and a strong military ruled via military
92. See id.
93. G.A. Res. 50/53, [ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/53 (Dec. 11, 1995).
94. BLAKESLEY, supra note 31, at 46.
95. Decreto No. 108, 11 Oct. 2006, Ley Especial Contra Actos De Terrorismo [Spe-
cial Law Against Acts of Terrorism] chap. III, art. 5, Diario Oficial, 17 Oct. 2006 (El Sal.)
(translated by author).
96. El Salvador: Terrorism Law Misused Against Protestors, HUM. RTs. WATCH, July 30,
2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/07/30/el-salvador-terrorism-law-misused-
against-protesters.
97. Decreto No. 108, 11 Oct. 2006, Ley Especial Contra Actos De Terrorismo [Spe-
cial Law Against Acts of Terrorism] chap. 1Il, art. 8, Diario Oficial, 17 Oct. 2006 (El Sal.)
(translated by author).
98. See INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCH., No
PLACE TO HIDE: GANG, STATE, AND CLANDESTINE VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR 70-71 (2007)
[hereinafter No PLACE TO HIDE], available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
hrp/documents/FinalESalvadorReport(3-6-07).pdf (discussing the July 5, 2006 protest
at the National University in San Salvador and pointing out the parallels between con-
flicts between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government during the civil war and the
Salvadoran government's current discourse characterizing the FMLN as terrorists); see
also Rauil Gutierrez, DD HH-EI Salvador: El Fantasma de La Guerra a 15 Afios de la Paz
[DD HH-El Salvador: The Ghost of the War to Fifteen Years of Peace], NOTICIAS EN ESPAS&OL,
July 16, 2007, http://ipsnoticias.net/nota.asp?idnews=41511 (discussing El Salvador's
political history and pointing to the parallels between the army's repression of civilians
during the civil war and the PNC's recent repression of the protestors in Suchitoto).
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regimes that stifled political dissent with violence and blocked progressive
reform. 100 Paramilitary groups, backed by the government and the oligar-
chy, massacred anyone who spoke out against the government. 10 1 Today,
the paramilitary groups are gone, but the government has criminalized
speaking out against it as a terrorist activity. 10 2
Between 1970 and 1977, El Salvador experienced a series of fraudu-
lent elections that undermined its democracy. 10 3 If an opposition candi-
date won an election, the National Coalition Party, the military, the
oligarchy, and the United States prevented his assent to power. 10 4 During
1975 and 1976, then President Arturo Armando Molina attempted to
implement Agrarian Reform that would redistribute land to farmers in
order to fight underdevelopment.10 5 However, the oligarchy and the
National Association of Private Companies violently resisted the
reform. '0 6 Therefore, the Legislative Assembly changed the law that would
create the Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian Reform and ensured the pro-
ject's failure. 10 7 This history of preventing the opposition party from tak-
ing control of the government has great potential to repeat itself today,
especially because conservative governments have ruled El Salvador since
the end of the civil war. 108
During the 1970s, farmers, laborers, and teachers knew that the cor-
rupt government expected them to be obedient, yet they organized and
started revolutionary social movements anyway.10 9 Teachers organized
strikes and protests against the government's proposed educational
reforms. 110 The teachers opposed the reforms because they would hurt
the educational system."' Organized student groups and labor organiza-
tions joined the protests in solidarity. 112 President Molina responded to
the protests with military intervention. 13 On July 19, 1972, he closed the
University of El Salvador and accused students of being communists
100. See PAUL D. ALMEIDA, WAVES OF PROTEST: PoPu.:AR STRUGGLE IN EL SALVADOR,
1925-2005, at 150-51, 167 (2008) (detailing state repression through the massacres of
the 1970s and 1980s).
101. See id.
102. See infra Part II.C.
103. See HernAndez, supra note 99, at 109.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 110.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 110-18. The current trend of increased repression is probably, in part,
a result of the increasing support for the more liberal opposition party in El Salvador and
the threat it presents to the conservative government's continuing dominance. See Saca
afirma que victoria del FMLN alejarfa al pais de Estados Unidos [Saca Affirms that FMLN's
Victory Will Distance the Countryfrom the United States], EFE NEWSWIRE - RELEVANTES DE
CENTRAL AMERICA (El Sal.), Nov. 12, 2007, http://noticias.terra.com/articulo/html/act1
035741.htm [hereinafter Saca Affirms FMLN's Victory]; see also ALMEIDA, supra note 100,
at 184.
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because they were inspired by revolutionaries Che Guevara and Salvador
Allende.'1 4 University authorities and foreign professors were thrown out
of the country. 115 In September 1973, the government opened the Univer-
sity under the direction of the Provisional Governing Council of the Uni-
versity of El Salvador (the Council). 1 6 The Council-backed University
Police violently oppressed the administrators, professors, and students. 1 17
In response, professors and students organized revolutionary groups." 8 It
appears that the fear of communism that existed in the 1970s has yet to
dissipate. 1 19 The current Salvadoran government, under President Elias
Antonio Saca, has warned citizens that electing candidates from the FMLN
party in the upcoming elections will lead the country to communism.' 20
The oligarchy has also accused the progressive wing of the Catholic
Church of destabilizing the social order by informing the poor and the
farmers of their rights and encouraging them to organize to fight for those
rights. 12 1 During the 1960s and 1970s, the number of Catholic Christian
base communities (CEBs) increased in both urban and rural neighbor-
hoods, and in the 1970s, these CEBs made increasing political demands for
the poor.1 2 2 Between 1970 and 1982 many priests were persecuted and
some were assassinated. 1 23 In 1977, Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero
organized protests against the government in response to the assassina-
tions. 1 24 He demanded that the government explain the reasons behind
the assassinations, but the government refused to take responsibility. 1 25 In
March 1980, he too became a victim of the government's repressive powers
when a Death Squad, a group of paramilitaries with government authority
to assassinate dissidents, killed him.1 2 6
In 1977, Military General Carlos H. Romero, who identified with the
military and the oligarchy, came into power, though many suggested that
he won by way of electoral fraud. 1 27 General Romero announced that he
would not tolerate leftist terrorism, but that his regime would bring social
change and tranquility. 1 28 On February 28, 1977, the Uni6n Nacional
Opositora (UNO), an opposition party, protested the electoral fraud at
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plaza and exiled UNO's candidates. 130 The ruling powers accused UNO of
being a Christian-Marxist alliance that would introduce El Salvador to com-
munism via the Church's influence. 131 To prevent further political opposi-
tion, President Romero enacted the Law of Defense and Guaranty of Public
Order on November 27, 1977.132 Since the 1960s, the oligarchy had
financed emerging groups of paramilitaries. 133 One such group was The
Nationalist Democratic Organization (NDO), a rightist paramilitary organi-
zation formed in the late 1960s with direct ties to government security
forces. 134 This group endeavored to suppress peasant organization, and it
did so with increasing violence. 135 Under the Law of Defense and Guar-
anty of Public Order, the NDO and other paramilitary groups gained
authority to kill opponents of the regime; these groups became known as
Los Escuadrones de la Muerte, or Death Squads. 136
The similarities between the oppressive law passed by President
Romero in 1977 and the SLAAT are striking. Both laws have the facial
objective of defending the public order, while they are in fact being used to
weaken the opposition. This history of repression is likely to repeat itself if
the current legislative trend of repression continues.
In the 1960s, the opposition groups knew they could not survive
through legitimate political means. 137 They felt forced to form revolution-
ary groups to express their dissent and to survive the constant attacks from
the government. 138 Their tactics displayed influences of the Cuban revolu-
tion, the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan guerillas, Salvador Allende, and
national liberation movements worldwide. 139 Between 1970 and 1979, cit-
izens formed multiple guerilla groups. 140 In 1974, the Popular Liberation
Forces Farabundo Marti (FPL)-founded on April 1, 1970-and a remnant
of the Salvadoran Communist Party, which had tried to organize armed
struggle in the 1960s, 141 organized the Bloque Popular Revolucionario
(BPR), a mass front that brought together all the peasant and union organi-
zations associated with the FPL. 142 On July 30, 1975, General Romero
ordered the assassination of high school and University of El Salvador stu-
dents because they were protesting in front of the Social Security Insti-
tute. 143 In response, the BPR seized the Metropolitan Cathedral.144
130. Id. at 110-11.
131. Id. at 110.
132. Decreto No. 407, 24 Nov. 1977, Ley de Garantia y Defensa del Orden Pttblico
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The government's repressive tactics in response to the takeover of the
Cathedral, such as removing people forcefully, using guns, and causing
many deaths, triggered opposition groups to retaliate. 145 Armed leftist
groups kidnapped and assassinated prominent business and political lead-
ers. 146 These guerilla groups were split along ideological and tactical
lines. 147 However, despite their differing positions, the guerrilla organiza-
tions all had a strong desire to start a popular democracy and get rid of the
elite oligarchyl 48 -a desire which encouraged unified revolutionary action
and allowed the groups to mobilize hundreds of thousands of supporters
for demonstrations and strikes. 149 The guerillas were also able to obtain
weapons from private dealers in Costa Rica and Nicaragua.' 50
At the same time, Romero's inability to address national problems and
the threat of the growing guerilla movements led to a regime change. 151
Young military officers ousted the Romero government in a coup on Octo-
ber 15, 1979.152 The coup consisted of an alliance between military fac-
tions, the social democrats, the Christian democrats, and some business
factions.15 3 This junta proposed socioeconomic reforms, but failed to sub-
due the increasing violence. 154 Rightist leaders eventually took charge of
the junta and expelled some of the reformers.' 5 5 The emerging govern-
ment could no longer reconcile the different societal interests, 15 6 and as a
consequence, the moderate left joined the revolutionary forces. 157
The first junta eventually failed and a second junta replaced it on Janu-
ary 10, 1980.158 At the same time, five guerilla groups joined together and
formed the FMLN; they later joined with another guerilla coalition to form
the FMLN-FDR.' 59 This coalition coordinated opposition strategy, fielded
4000 troops and 5000 militia, and controlled several zones of the coun-
try. 160 They gained legitimacy abroad and began planning their take-
over. 161 Their representatives operated openly in Panama, Nicaragua, Mex-
ico, Colombia, and the United States.162 Meanwhile, the U.S. government
provided military aid, advice, and economic assistance to the Salvadoran
145. Bird & Williams, supra note 53, at 30.
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military.1 63 This military aid, in the form of training, weapons, aircrafts,
and intelligence held the Salvadoran army together long enough to fight the
FMLN effectively and to prolong the civil conflict. 164
Despite the widespread armed conflict, El Salvador held regularly
scheduled elections beginning in 1982; and in 1984, the country elected a
civilian president, PDC leader Jose Napole6n Duarte. 165 The following
year, the PDC took a majority of the legislative seats. 16 6 The United States
was interested in backing Duarte and the PDC and therefore provided them
with financial, technical, and political resources. 16 7 The underlying ratio-
nale for this support was that creating opportunities for the moderates to
participate in the government would aid in the fight against commu-
nism. 168 But, despite the moderates' success in coming into power, the
military's strength did not weaken as it continued to confirm that its inter-
ests were satisfied. 16 9
Even after the Central American Peace Accord was signed in Guate-
mala,170 neither the Salvadoran conservatives and military nor the United
States were interested in compromising with the rebels. 17 1 Consequently,
both the Salvadoran military and the United States hindered Duarte's
attempts to negotiate with the FMLN-FDR, even though the rebels had been
willing to work out a compromise with the conservatives since late
1982.172 In 1989, despite the FMLN's willingness to participate in the
presidential elections, the government ignored their request for democratic
protections and had the elections without them. 173 Ignoring the FMLN's
offer to participate in the rising democracy was consistent with the United
States' previous unwillingness to negotiate with the FMLN-FDR, and with
their support of the Salvadoran military in the Salvadoran military's
attempts to defeat the FMLN. Alfredo Cristiani, the leader of the conserva-
tive Nationalist Republican Alliance Party (ARENA), won the presidential
election. 174 Cristiani, who came from a rich aristocratic family and had
been educated in the United States, had the support of the U.S.
government. 1
75
The government's outright unwillingness to cooperate with the FMLN
induced the rebel groups to increase their offensive strategies. 176 The
FMLN mounted a military offensive in the capital city of San Salvador to
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increase pressure on the government to cooperate. 177 In response, the mil-
itary killed many innocent people who were accused of sympathizing with
the rebels. 178 The most infamous military attack was the murder of six
Jesuit priest-intellectuals, their housekeeper, and her daughter at the Cen-
tral American University. 179 The increased violence inspired the United
States and El Salvador's political parties to support the peace process.180
The Salvadoran government and the FMLN signed a peace agreement
on January 16, 1992.181 The government reduced the size of its army,
disassembled the National Police, and formed the National Civil Police
(PNC), which drew its members from both the FMLN and from govern-
ment. 18 2 The FMLN disbanded its forces by early 1993 and, beginning in
1994, the government granted it political party status. 183 The 1994 elec-
tions were the first truly democratic elections in El Salvador and parties
competed for seats in the government without any claims of electoral
fraud. 184 The FMLN was even able to gain electoral support in the 2000
and 2003 elections. 18 5 Since these elections, El Salvador has made a great
deal of progress in creating a strong democracy. 18 6 However, some people
in El Salvador do not think there is a bright outlook for the future and
instead believe that the country is walking a thin line that may ultimately
lead to another armed conflict. 18 7
C. Repressing Dissent Today: Application of the Special Law Against
Acts of "Terrorism"
Despite the fact that El Salvador is now a democratic nation, the con-
servative government continues to use repression and violence to stay in
power. Currently, the Salvadoran government is using the guise of fighting
terrorism to repress political opposition and the SLAAT is its new weapon
in the fight for control.
The most controversial application of the SLAAT occurred on July 2,
2007 when President Saca planned to announce the government's decen-
tralization plan for the water distribution system in Suchitoto, El Salva-
dor. 188 Members of community groups and NGOs protested against the
decentralization plan, claiming that it was a plan to privatize the water dis-
tribution service.189 Protestors blocked the highways that the official com-
mittee and members of the diplomatic corps would use to arrive at the
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event, 190 and some protestors threw rocks at the police. 19 1 The police
intercepted the vehicle transporting Lorena Martinez, the president of the
Association of Rural Communities for the Development of El Salvador
(CRIPDES); Rosa Maria Valle, the organization's Vice President; and
Haydee Chicas, a reporter who was filming the events. 19 2 The police
arrested Martinez, Valle, and Chicas for protesting, even though Chicas
identified herself as a member of the press. 19 3 Ten others were arrested
and charged with "acts of terrorism."1 9 4 Reporters Without Borders con-
demned the journalist's arrest and demanded her release. 195 Although all
those arrested were released, under the SLAAT they still faced the possibil-
ity of sixty-year sentences.' 96 However, due to international activism and
the prosecution's inability to substantiate its accusations of terrorism, the
government has since dropped the terrorism charges against those
arrested. 197
In an interview with National Public Radio (NPR), Lorena Martinez
stated that she and the other passengers in the vehicle were neither told the
reason for their arrests nor were they read their rights.198 Martinez argued
that the purpose of the anti-terrorism law was not to counter terrorist
threats, but rather to threaten social movements in El Salvador.199 The
people arrested were charged under Article 5 of the anti-terrorism law
because they allegedly acted "against the life, the personal integrity, the
liberty or security of . . .a public official" 200 when they threw rocks at
police officials. 20 1 Although the act of throwing rocks would be consid-
ered criminal under most criminal statutes,20 2 it would not likely be con-
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sidered an act of terrorism that justifies punishment. 20 3 Moreover, neither
Martinez nor any of the passengers in the vehicle were part of the violence
at the protest because they were intercepted before their arrival at the
site. 204
Mr. Astor Escalante, El Salvador's Vice Minister for Security and Public
Safety, admitted to NPR that "[t]here is a big difference between Osama bin
Laden and the person who threw that rock,"20 5 but he found this differ-
ence to be irrelevant and focused mainly on the language in Article 5 of the
law. 206 His attitude is consistent with some states' beliefs that only their
enemies can commit terrorism. 20 7 In fact, the conservative government
currently in power in El Salvador believes that anyone on the political left is
an enemy of the government and a potential terrorist.20 8 Mr. Ulises Cam-
pos, the Risk Management Coordinator for the environmental group
Unidad Ecol6gica Salvadorefia (UNES), believes that the government is
making the left synonymous with terrorism.20 9
El Salvador's President Elias Antonio Saca reflected on the position of
the current Salvadoran government when he warned citizens that electing
an FMLN candidate in the 2009 elections would lead to communism in El
Salvador and would separate the country from its ally, the United
States. 210 The FMLN, formerly a guerilla group during the civil war, has
become an official political party in El Salvador and chose journalist Mau-
ricio Funes and representative Salvador Sanchez Cer~n as the candidates
for President and Vice-President of El Salvador in the election. 211 This
development, and the conservative government's response, are of particu-
lar importance because they are reminiscent of the conditions that began
the civil war in the early 1980s. 2 1 2 The FMLN's increasing strength also
increases the likelihood that the Salvadoran government will use the cur-
rent anti-terrorism law to repress dissent, both because the conservatives
consider the FMLN a threat to their power and because they consider the
FMLN and anyone on the left to be terrorists. This attitude is also reminis-
cent of the prevailing attitude of the ruling elite in the 1960s and 1970s
203. See NPR Broadcast, supra note 8 (quoting Human Rights Watch's statement that
"destroying or damaging the belongings of government officials or their physical person"
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toward the leftist opposition, 2 13 and the repression is similar to that which
occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. 2 14 The danger of returning to the past
and to the breakdown of democracy is clear.
Another instance where the Salvadoran government used the SLAAT
to stifle dissent occurred on February 10, 2007 in response to a protest by
a group of merchants in Apopa, El Salvador. 2 15 The Municipal Police force
confronted the merchants, who were protesting announced evictions. 2 16
The merchants used gasoline to burn an automobile as part of the pro-
test.2 17 Several individuals were arrested and charged under Articles 15
and 34 of the SLAAT. 2 18 Article 15 prohibits the use of any "weapons,
artifacts, or explosive substances ... in a public place or public installa-
tion," and an act violating this provision is punishable with a sentence of
forty to sixty years in prison. 2 19 Article 34 lists the aggravating circum-
stances that will increase the penalty indicated by the law, including the
commission of a terrorist act by two or more persons. 220
On February 17, 2007, the PNC arrested Vicente Ramirez, the Presi-
dent of the Salvadoran National Association of Workers, Salespersons, and
Small Merchants (ANTRAVEPECOS) in connection with the protests in
Apopa. 22 1 The district attorney charged him with acts of terrorism under
the above-mentioned sections of the SLAAT. 22 2 Ramirez and several ven-
dors were later released because the judge did not consider them to have
participated in terrorist activities, but rather in public disorder. 22 3 This
example demonstrates the constant struggle for justice in Salvadoran soci-
ety. Although the protestors were wrong for setting a vehicle on fire
because of the danger posed to the community and themselves, the appli-
cable punishment under the SLAAT would have be excessive-forty to sixty
years of imprisonment. The potential for such severe punishment strongly
supports the contention that the Salvadoran government is using the law to
repress dissent.
213. See Robert W. Taylor & Harry E. Vanden, Defining Terrorism in El Salvador: "La
Matanza", 463 ANNALS Am. AcAD. POL. & SoC. Sci 106, 111-12 (1982) (discussing the
government's practice of labeling opposition groups as terrorists).
214. ALMEIDA, supra note 100, at 150-53; BOOTH ET AL., supra note 51, at 101-10.
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Governments can often exercise repressive tactics with initial public
approval because citizens expect that political agents will use repression to
eliminate threats to citizens' safety and to protect the security of govern-
ment personnel, policies, and institutions.224 Professor Christian Daven-
port refers to the interactions between states and dissidents as the "Law of
Coercive Monopolization," under which it is almost certain that repression
will follow dissent. 225 Davenport argues that authorities do not necessa-
rily wait for dissident behavior to apply repression, but instead political
leaders identify threats after some dissent has already taken place, using
repression under the guise that additional problems are imminent.22 6 It is
beneficial to a state to respond to behavioral threats such as boycotts or
demonstrations because countering or eliminating these behaviors
increases the state's legitimacy and the possibility that the ruling powers
will survive politically. 22 7
Individuals in threatened societies are more likely to think coercion is
a legitimate way to maintain the status quo.2 28 Governments can manipu-
late citizens' perceived level of threat through political means, such as press
releases, congressional hearings, and legislation. 229 In the case of El Salva-
dor, the conservative government is trying to make its citizens believe there
is a threat to their status quo.2 30 For example, President Elias Antonio
Saca responded to the nomination of the FMLN's presidential candidate
(and to many Salvadoran citizens' positive responses to the nomination) by
warning citizens that voting for the left would lead to the rise of a commu-
nist regime and a severance of El Salvador's alliance with the United
States. 23 1 President Saca's condemnation of many protestors and demon-
strators as terrorists is another example of the Salvadoran government try-
ing to establish the presence of a threat in the minds of its citizens.23 2
For almost twenty years, the ARENA party has been at the forefront of
the Salvadoran government and has become the status quo.2 33 For the first
224. See Christian Davenport, Licensing Repression: Dissent, Threats and State Repres-
sion in the United States, 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 311, 311 (2007) (describing the objective of
state repression).
225. Id. at 312.
226. Id. at 312-13.
227. Id. at 316.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 317.
230. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 51, at 114.
231. Saca Affirms FMLN's Victory, supra note 108.
232. See, e.g., Daniel Choto, Saca: Violencia de Ayer es "Terrorismo" [Saca: Yesterday's
Violence is "Terrorism"], AGENCIAS (El Sal.), May 13, 2007, http://www.elsalvador.com/
mwedh/nota/notacompleta.asp?idCat-6329&idArt1371242 (reporting that President
Saca classified the individuals who burned three vehicles during a confrontation
between street vendors and the National Civil Police (PNC) as "terrorists," and insisted
that the term "terrorist" applies to those who "overturn a car in the street and burns it,
who attack businesses and destroys them, and who commit acts of vandalism") (trans-
lated by author); Two Police Killed in El Salvador, supra note 15 (stating that President
Saca blamed the protestors' terrorist acts on the FMLN).
233. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 51, at 111-12.
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time since the party gained the presidency after the civil war, ARENA is
starting to feel seriously threatened by the opposition and is fighting to
maintain its position of dominance. 234 The Salvadoran ruling party uses
the global fear of terrorism and the pretext of fighting terrorism to repress
the voice of dissent through the use of the SLAAT.
III. The Salvadoran Anti-Terrorism Law Violates its Citizens' Rights
A. The Anti-Terrorism Law Violates Article 6 of the Salvadoran
Constitution
The vague language of the SLAAT makes it possible for the law to be
easily applied to activities that would be protected as expressions of free
speech under El Salvador's Constitution.23 5 Article 6 of the Salvadoran
Constitution provides:
All persons may freely express and disseminate their thoughts so long as
they do not subvert public order, nor harm the morality, the honor, nor the
private lives of others. The exercise of this right will not be subject to prior
approval, censure nor precaution; but those who in using it, violate the laws,
will be responsible for the crime they commit.2 36
Although the Salvadoran Constitution limits freedom of speech in situa-
tions in which its expression destabilizes public order, 23 7 Salvadoran crim-
inal law could properly address this limitation. 238 Thus, it is not necessary
to apply anti-terrorism legislation to expressions of thought which subvert
the public order.
If the penal law-which would likely have punished the July 5, 2006
student protests at the University of El Salvador-was not effectively
addressing the problem of riots, then the appropriate response should have
been to determine why the law was ineffective, not to use the incendiary
term "terrorism" to categorize the crime. 23 9 Hastily creating anti-terrorism
legislation and then liberally applying it to situations that do not fit an
equitable definition of terrorism may even weaken the deterrence goal of
the law. If a state applies a severe punishment to a public disturbance by a
few individuals legitimately protesting, then what punishment will it then
use when a whole organization actually conspires to destroy the fabric of
society through illegitimate means? Kent Roach argues that the harsher
penalties imposed by new criminal laws against terrorism actually have
marginal deterrence value. 240
234. See id. at 112-13; see also Schmidt & Makin, supra note 211, at A5.
235. Constituci6n de la Republica de El Salvador tit. II, ch. 1, art. 6, Diario Oficial,
Tomo No. 281, 16 Dec. 1983 (El Sal.).
236. Id. (translated by author).
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238. Cf. Roach, supra note 74, at 130 (arguing that there are virtues to using criminal
law as a response to terrorism, and thereby suggesting that the criminal law is not neces-
sarily deficient in dealing with domestic threats to the public safety).
239. See id. at 136 ("9/11 was much more a failure of law enforcement and intelli-
gence coordination than a failure of the criminal law.").
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The application of the law in the Suchitoto water protest situation
illustrates the violation of Article 6 of the Salvadoran Constitution. There,
the PNC confronted the protestors even though they were peacefully assem-
bling.2 4 1 Many of those arrested were deprived of the due process rights
afforded by Articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution.24 2 While the Constitu-
tion limits free speech in order to protect the people, the application of the
anti-terrorism law is more concerned with protecting the government and
government officials. The pro-government focus of the law is evidenced by
the fact that many protestors who suddenly become alleged terrorists, like
the protestors in Suchitoto, have been arrested under Article 5, which pro-
hibits acts against the lives, liberty, and security of public officials. 24 3
B. The Anti-Terrorism Law Violates El Salvador's International Treaty
Obligations
El Salvador is party to several international covenants, conventions,
and declarations which include provisions that protect freedom of expres-
sion and the right to peaceful assembly. 244 These include the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 245 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 24 6 and the American Convention on Human Rights. 2 47 El
Salvador's blind application of the anti-terrorism law violates its citizens'
human rights, which are protected under these international agreements.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[elveryone
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes free-
dom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." 248
It also provides the right to "freedom of peaceful assembly." 24 9 In 1968,
the United Nations International Conference on Human Rights agreed that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "states a common understand-
241. Tania Membrefio &Jtssica Avalos, Protestas Terminan en Disturbios en Suchitoto
[Protests End in Disturbances in Suchitoto], LA PRENSA GRAFICA (El Sal.), July 3, 2007, at
28, available at http://www.laprensagrafica.net/nacion/816095.asp (quoting a protestor
who stated that the PNC provoked the disturbances when the protestors were trying to
assemble peacefully).
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Oficial, Tomo No. 281, 16 Dec. 1983 (El Sal.) (guaranteeing that a person who is
detained should be informed in an immediate and comprehensible manner of her rights
and the reasons for her detention, and that she cannot be forced to testify); see NPR
Broadcast, supra note 8 (providing that Lorena Martinez of CRIPDES alleged her due
process rights were violated when she, three persons from her organization, and a jour-
nalist were detained without being told the reason for the detention, without being read
their rights, and without being asked for identification to verify they were in fact the
persons who should be arrested).
243. Decreto No. 108, 11 Oct. 2006, Ley Especial Contra Actos De Terrorismo [Spe-
cial Law Against Acts of Terrorism] chap. III, art. 5, Diario Oficial, 17 Oct. 2006 (El
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ing of the peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable
rights of all members of the human family and constitutes an obligation for
the members of the international community."2 50 El Salvador is therefore
bound by the obligations set forth in this declaration and has an obligation
to respect its citizens' rights to freedom of expression and peaceful
assembly.
In addition, El Salvador voluntarily ratified the American Convention
on Human Rights on June 23, 1978.251 Article 13 of the Convention pro-
tects a person's right to "freedom of thought and expression," including the
freedom "to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds...
either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other
medium of one's choice."2 52 Article 13 also provides that the exercise of
this right shall not be subject to prior censorship, but can be subject to
imposition of liability to ensure the "protection of national security [or]
public order."'2 53 Finally, El Salvador is party to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 25 4 Article 19 of the ICCPR pre-
serves the same rights protected by Article 13 of the American Convention
on Human Rights.2 55
In the examples of the application of the Salvadoran anti-terrorism law
mentioned earlier, 2 56 the government did not prevent protestors from
organizing the demonstrations. Therefore, it is possible that the Salvado-
ran government could argue that they did not violate any international
agreements. However, the preemptive arrests of the leaders of various orga-
nizations constitute an attempt to subvert the citizens' right to freedom of
expression. Further, the arbitrary arrest of Lorena Martinez and the vehi-
cle's occupants constitutes a violation of their right to be free from arbi-
trary or unlawful detention or arrest-a right which is also protected in the
previously mentioned covenants and declarations. 2 57
El Salvador's failure to safeguard the human rights protected under
international law presents a threat to its internal stability. 2 58 Contempo-
rary human rights violations are reminiscent of the reign of the oppressive
conservative government, which encouraged the murder and kidnapping of
250. International Conference on Human Rights, Apr. 22-May 13, 1968, Proclama-
tion of Tehran, 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (May 13, 1968).
251. See generally ACHR, supra note 26 (El Salvador ratified the Convention on June
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IV. International Implications of Vague Anti-Terrorism Laws
A. UN Authorization for Anti-Terrorism Legislation is Not a License for
Repression
After September 11, 2001, the UN Security Council addressed the
issue of international terrorism in Resolution 1373.260 This resolution
imposes obligations on UN Member States which include preventing and
repressing the financing of terrorism, preventing and criminalizing acts of
terrorism, and cooperating internationally by ratifying international anti-
terror treaties. 26 1 This resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, which authorizes the Security Council to "determine the exis-
tence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression"
and to decide "what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. ' ' 262 Article
41 gives the Security Council authority to "decide what measures... are to
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Mem-
bers of the United Nations to apply such measures."26 3 Because Chapter
VII gives the Security Council this authority, the obligations it imposes on
member states in Resolution 1373 are binding. 264 The Counter-Terrorism
Committee is responsible for monitoring states' implementation of the
resolution. 265
Despite the Security Council's mandate to member states to criminal-
ize terrorism, the UN has not been able to provide an agreed-upon, neutral
definition of terrorism. 266 This lack of definition, however, was not an
invitation to create the vague and neutral definitions that may allow states
to suppress opposition and minority groups. 26 7 Unfortunately, the man-
date of Resolution 1373 lacks an enforcement mechanism, and it is diffi-
cult for the UN to monitor the actual implementation of each state's
legislation.
Even if states argue that their vague anti-terrorism legislation complies
with Resolution 1373, they must still comply with their human rights obli-
gations under other treaties and conventions. 26 8 For example, the ICCPR
259. See BOOTH ET AL., supra note 51, at 101-08 (discussing the history of violence
and abduction under the conservative government); see also No PLACE TO HIDE, supra
note 98, at 70 ("In the days following the July 5 protests, government officials and oppo-
sition party leaders engaged in heated rhetorical battles that evoked the polarized dis-
course of the 1980s and revealed the fragility of the country's democratic transition.").
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protects non-derogable rights that states cannot ignore, even in the case of
an extreme emergency. 269 Neither El Salvador nor any other country can
use a "state of emergency" defense as an excuse to ignore its obligations
under the ICCPR.
B. Why El Salvador's Repression in the Name of Anti-Terrorism Matters
El Salvador's violation of its obligations under international human
rights treaties via the repression of political dissidents in the name of anti-
terrorism should not be ignored. Allowing the Salvadoran government to
continue repressing political opposition implies that the international com-
munity accepts legislation that deprives citizens of due process and vio-
lates their human rights. Further, the international community's failure to
object to overly broad legislation enacted in the name of the war on terror-
ism will only serve to encourage other states to do the same.
The domestic consequences of El Salvador's legislation can also have
an international impact. As mentioned earlier, El Salvador has a long his-
tory of responding to opposition with repression and violence.270 To
counter this response, the opposition engaged in guerilla warfare as a way
to resist the government's power, and a civil war ensued. 271 The current
situation in El Salvador has the ingredients of another breakdown of
democracy. Currently, left-wing parties are gaining power in Latin
America, which some consider a threat to the international political status
quo. 272 If the history of civil war and government repression repeats itself
in El Salvador, there could be serious consequences in Latin America.
President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, for example, would likely support
leftist opposition groups because he currently supports radical parties in
countries like El Salvador, Panama, and Nicaragua. 273 It would not be far-
fetched to see the United States getting involved in the same way as it did in
the previous civil war.
Conclusion
The purpose of enacting anti-terrorism legislation is to bring more sta-
bility to the international political scene, not to create more turmoil. The
Salvadoran government's current trend of repressing dissent through the
use of the SLAAT represents a threat to the stability of the nation's democ-
racy. The legislation's lack of a precise definition of what constitutes ter-
rorism has allowed the Salvadoran government to use the law as a tool to
quell political dissent, as evidenced in the repression of CRIPDES' protest
269. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Arti-
cle 4), T 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001).
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in Suchitoto. 2 74 Although the international community has failed to agree
on a neutral definition of terrorism, this should not prevent countries from
objecting to abuses of due process and internationally protected rights
such as freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly that stem
from vague anti-terrorism laws. If El Salvador continues repressing dissent
and opposition, it is in grave danger of repeating the history of civil war
and human rights violations that occurred in the 1980s.
Objecting to El Salvador's broad definition of terrorism will allow the
international community to move further in the direction of consensus on
an international definition of terrorism. Every step taken toward a defini-
tion will help nations to consolidate their efforts in the battle against ter-
rorism. No nation can stand alone against the transnational threat of
terrorist groups. It is therefore a mistake to think that the problems with El
Salvador's domestic legislation affect only its own citizens. A breach in El
Salvador's line of defense against terrorism and against human rights viola-
tions is a threat to the international community.
274. See supra Part I.C.

